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ABSTRACT

This document reports on a September 1990 meeting held in the People's Republic of China (PRC) involving National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA) representatives and officials from: China's State Education Commission (SEDC); major Chinese universities; the bureaus of higher education in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou; the United States embassy in China; and the United States Information Service (USIS). The meeting sought to investigate issues relating to Sino-American academic exchange, including the return of Chinese students and scholars to China after program completion, and the issuance of visas. After an introduction, the report discusses: (1) the history and status of Chinese students preparing to study abroad and the role of the USIS in China; (2) student flows to the United States including the types of students, types of sponsorship, regulations, and the notarization of U.S. admissions documents; (3) American policies regarding the awarding of visas to students, scholars and their dependents; (4) issues relating to the return of Chinese students to China after program completion; and (5) future prospects on China/United States relations concerning educational exchange. Appendices include a list of meeting participants and their affiliations, information on Advance Parole for PRC Nationals, visa issuance rates, and exit procedures for Chinese students and scholars. The NAFSA delegation found that the flow of Chinese students into U.S. colleges and universities appears to be continuing undiminished. (LPT)

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NAFSA Field Service

Working Paper # 18

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Dialogue on SINO - US Educational Exchange

NAFSA Delegation Report
Fall 1990

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Seven NAFSA representatives traveled to China in September, 1990 to explore some of the most pressing issues in Sino-American academic exchange. The members of the delegation endeavored to provide: a) an assessment of the overall environment for exchange; b) an airing of views on both sides regarding the issue of the return of Chinese students and scholars to China once they have completed their programs in the United States; c) a clarification of the requirement of an elaborate notarization process for all American university admissions documents before they could be used to issue exit permits for intending students, and other recently promulgated regulations; and d) a clarification of the policies regarding the issuance of visas by American consular sections.

The delegation met with representatives from China's State Education Commission (SEDC), several major universities, from the bureaus of higher education in Shanghai and Guangzhou, and with representatives from the U.S. Embassy and from the United States Information Service (USIS). These extensive discussions led to the clarification of a number of issues which have been reported in this working paper prepared by the members of the delegation. The NAFSA delegation visit to China was made possible by a grant from the Academic Programs Division of the United States Information Agency.

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DIALOGUE ON SINO - US EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE

NAFSA DELEGATION REPORT
FALL 1990

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September a delegation of seven NAFSA representatives spent two weeks exploring the most pressing issues in Sino-American academic exchanges. This NAFSA delegation was the Association's sixth to the People's Republic of China, but the first comprised entirely of people already familiar with China and its higher education system. The delegation met with representatives from China's State Education Commission (SEDC), several major universities, the bureaus of higher education in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and with representatives from the U.S. Embassy and from the United States Information Service (USIS). These extensive discussions led to the clarification of a number of issues reported in this working paper prepared by the members of the delegation.

Our four major objectives were:

***An assessment of the overall environment for exchange between the United States and China.**

***An airing of views on both sides regarding the issue of the return of Chinese students and scholars to China once they have completed their programs in the United States.**

***A clarification of the requirement of an elaborate notarization process for all American university admissions documents before they could be used to issue exit permits for intending students, and other recently promulgated regulations.**

***A clarification of the policies regarding the issuance of visas by American consular sections, a process which is perceived as arbitrary and unpredictable both by Chinese applicants and their American sponsors.**

Our most important finding was that the volume of the exchange, specifically the flow of Chinese students into American colleges and universities, appears to be continuing undiminished. This conclusion was contrary to expectations given the new regulations, including the five-year work rule promulgated in February, 1990 and the shift in government sponsored awards away from the matriculated students in favor of older scholars going abroad for shorter periods of time.

A number of factors contribute to this unabated flow, despite the seemingly restrictive regulations. First, a large number of potential students have already fulfilled their five-year work requirement. Second, students with direct relatives abroad do not need to fulfill these regulations. Lastly, students and scholars are finding ways around the regulations which are not being enforced uniformly.

SEDC officials continued to deny earlier reports that some of the more restrictive regulations, such as the five-year rule for study abroad and the year of grass-roots work required before graduate study, would be repealed soon. On the contrary, they expressed a desire to stabilize the regulations governing education and exchange by leaving the current policies in place for some time. However, at least one official at a university expressed the opinion that these regulations would be changed in the near future.

Nearly all the SEDC officials and the university administrators made the point that China's policy of sending scholars and students to study abroad had not changed in the aftermath of Tiananmen and would not change in the future. These statements were supported by figures released by officials at the U.S. consulate in Beijing which revealed that the total number of F-1 and J-1 visas issued in June of 1990 was higher than in June of 1988. Nevertheless, plans to alter the profile of the publicly sponsored scholars toward older, short-term scholars were being implemented. In 1988 US consulate offices in China issued a total of approximately 2,700 J-1 visas; by 1990 the total for the same period was down to approximately 1,525. A comparison F-1 figures for the same to periods reveals a sharp rise: 1988: 2,075; 1990: 4,250. (All figures are approximations.)

The most persistent issue was the return of Chinese students and scholars once they had completed their studies. Anxiety in China over the return issue is felt most clearly in the universities, where the shortage of trained faculty and other personnel is felt most acutely. Examples of how widespread the Chinese universities feel the problem to be were numerous. Beijing University of Aeronautics has received back on time only 3 of 22 PhD candidates it sponsored to go abroad in its faculty development program. Zhongshan University in Guangzhou has sent 136 faculty members to the U.S. in ten years; only 6 have returned so far.

While both sides acknowledged the problem, there were consistent differences between the members of the delegation and Chinese officials regarding the source of the problem of extended stay. Officials at the SEDC and elsewhere would only acknowledge materialism and lack of patriotism as the motivations of students extending their stays. As NAFSA representatives, we countered this perception with a more accurate description of the situation in the United States. According to information available to date the large majority of the 40,000 PRC students and scholars still in the U.S. are maintaining non-immigrant status and intend to return once they believe that conditions there are satisfactory.

We stated that many students have not returned because they believe China to be too politically risky and unstable. The document which surfaced earlier this year dividing Chinese students in the United States into five political categories was presented as an example of the tactics which chill the atmosphere and inhibit return. The existence of this document was initially acknowledged, then later denied. Nevertheless, the delegation emphasized that the perception that returning home is politically risky will continue to dissuade students from returning as long as it exists.

Regarding policies which might encourage return, we were assured that those who returned would not be subjected to persecution or discrimination. Nor, according to SEDC officials in Beijing, would returnees receive any special compensation or enticements, although there was some disagreement on this point at some campuses.

Members of the delegation were pleased to learn that the elaborate notarization process required for admissions documents from U.S. campuses had been intended to address situations in other countries and that it no longer applied to the United States. This shift in policy was due in part to the coordinated response from NAFSA which had sent a letter in June stating its objections and advocating noncompliance.

Overall, NAFSA was pleased with the exchange of information and views, and hope that future delegations will continue the dialogue begun by this group.

I. Introduction

This NAFSA delegation was the sixth to the People's Republic of China. In 1985 the first delegation was formed at the invitation of the State Education Commission (SEDC) and the cooperation of the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA). That first delegation was followed by four more over the next several years. A sixth delegation was planned for the Fall of 1989, but was postponed for review after the events around Tiananmen Square of June 4, 1989.

At the request of SEDC, members on the early delegations were made up of NAFSAns who worked directly with large numbers of Chinese students and scholars and who had never previously visited China. Also SEDC wanted people from each of the Chinese Consular districts in the United States. NAFSA assisted SEDC in the selection of delegation members. The fourth and fifth delegations were selected on a more cooperative basis with the Chinese and members were selected from a wider range of exchange professionals. These early delegations focused primarily on giving NAFSA members an opportunity to become more familiar with Chinese universities and colleges, student life in China and a broad range of historical and culture aspects of Chinese society. These were, in effect, a useful orientation and familiarization sojourn for those who had no previous experience in China. These visits along with increased numbers of Chinese students and scholars on U.S. campuses served to stimulate interest in China and to develop a growing core of people with some direct experience with China itself.

In early Fall, 1989 the NAFSA leadership determined that a sixth delegation should be formed to visit China, but not on the same basis as the previous five. Events in China after June 4, 1989 created a special need to understand how June 4th had affected international educational exchanges with the PRC. Indeed, it was determined that the need for information and an assessment by NAFSA about the status of exchanges with China was more vital than ever. Previous assumptions about the nature of Sino/American educational relations required a review by NAFSA in order to determine the manner in which such exchanges would or could continue into the 1990's and beyond. The matter of a sixth delegation was initiated by the Advisory Committee of US/China Exchanges and discussed within the NAFSA Executive Committee, Board of Directors and USIA. Chinese authorities were also contacted through their Embassy in Washington D.C. All agreed that such a delegation would be useful. It was also determined that the delegation would be smaller then previous groups, and that all delegation members should have had some previous experience in China. In short, this delegation was formed for the purpose of having direct conversations with various Chinese authorities about educational exchange policy in China and the United States.

During our ten days in China we met with international exchange officials at the State Education Commission (SEDC), including Vice Chairman Teng Teng; Yu Fuzeng, Director General, Department of International Cooperation; and He Jinqiu, Director General, Department of Overseas Studies. (For a list of people with whom the delegation met, see Appendix C). In addition to meetings at SEDC, the delegation visited campuses, advising centers, higher education bureaus, and other agencies concerned with China's higher education policies. We also made visiting American USIS and consular posts a high priority. This report concentrates on the exchange process and policy as it relates to Chinese students either preparing to study or currently studying in the United States. While there are a number of other issues which need to be addressed, including the opportunities for American students and scholars to study in China, the most pressing issues in Sino-U.S. educational exchange at the time of the delegation's visit were the policies affecting Chinese students and their opportunities to study in the United States. Beginning with the dissemination of information and availability of advising, these are the issues addressed most extensively in our report.

II. Chinese Students Preparing to Go Abroad: Student Advising in China

Each year thousands of Chinese students seek admission to universities in the United States. Our experience makes it clear that a large number of those who apply and, sadly, many of those who actually enroll in our universities, chose their prospective universities with little information and even less guidance. As a result, universities across the country are extremely anxious that efforts to improve the availability of timely, accurate information about U.S. higher education throughout China continue.

Although the delegation was only able to visit the advising centers at the Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange (CSCSE) in Beijing and Shanghai Foreign Language Institute, several members of the delegation have had extensive involvement with advising services in China.

A. History and Current Status

Currently, information about U.S. higher education is available through a handful of active advising centers which provide access to printed materials and advising services. The level of accessibility and the capacity to provide quality advising varies widely. (Because of the Chinese government's disapproval of single country advising centers, independent centers have not been established to distribute information on U.S. institutions.) There also exists a larger number of passive advising centers, chiefly located in provincial or municipal libraries. For the most part, these are simply repositories of information including the USIS Minimum Reference Bookshelf (MRB) (See Appendix G). In practice, access to these limited collections of material can be very difficult.

Over the past five years, as one of its educational activities in China, USIS has endeavored to support and encourage the development of information dissemination/advisory services in China. In addition to providing the MRB, the recently concluded five-year plan included: funding for Chinese student advisors to attend the U.S. based training program for overseas advisors; a series of short-term visits to the advising centers by American consultants; and a more ambitious final phase which placed an American consultant in China for 18 months and sent a State Education Commission (SEDC) employee to the U.S. to complete a masters degree.

In addition to USIS, IIE has been active in China in support of indigenous advising services. Their office in Guangzhou (1986-1989) served thousands of self-sponsored students from southern provinces going to America to study. This office also conducted outreach and training programs in other cities, and published a newsletter in Chinese on American universities and their China exchanges. Now based in Hong Kong, IIE's effort, known as America Bound, focuses on improving predeparture orientation programs in the active advising centers. IIE's advising support activities have been supported by American foundations and have proceeded in consultation with USIS/China.

Throughout most of the 1985-1990 period a number of factors tended to confound many of efforts to improve advising services. First, throughout most of this period an infrastructure through which to work effectively did not exist in China. Each of the advising centers, active or passive, belonged to different local work units. There was little recognition of the value of the work of providing advising services. In the middle of that period, the perception began to grow that China had a major problem with the return of its students and scholars. While the attention of many leaders in Chinese education was diverted by this issue, they did not perceive that good advising should be a part of any comprehensive plan to address the problem. In addition to these two factors, there was confusion in the education bureaucracy surrounding the reorganization of the SEDC announced in early 1989. Finally, shortly after this reorganization was announced, the student demonstrations began. Student advising was not high on the list of priorities for many months.

B. Prospects for Future Development

With the creation in 1989 of the Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange (CSCSE), the parent organization of the advising center in Beijing, we now may be entering a time of progress. The original organization was separated from the Beijing Language Institute and elevated to the status of a nongovernmental organization with a mandate to deliver advisory student support services nationally. While it is not clear that SEDC officials truly value its advising function, this elevation in status with its national mandate and the importance in which the CSCSE's other functions are held provides a new opportunity.

Furthermore, the leadership of the CSCSE and its advising center have demonstrated their commitment to delivering advising services by assembling all the necessary components for an effective advising

operation. In the area of equipment and materials they have made substantial investments. In addition to the MRB provided by USIS, they have purchased additional reference material, and annually write to more than 1,000 U.S. colleges and universities to request catalogs and other information. They have a computer and the College Board's Foreign Student Information Clearinghouse software which now are in the advising center where they are frequently used. Also, within the advising center, there is a photocopier and microfiche readers, one of which will produce paper copies. This latter item, which they purchased, means that the microfiche collection of U.S. college catalogs (purchased by USIS) and the microfiche collection of foreign university catalogs (purchased by CSCSE) are extensively used. The investment in material and equipment is impressive, but the real potential strength of the CSCSE and its advising center is its management and personnel.

The advising center at Shanghai Language Institute is smaller than that at the CSCSE (it has about 5,500 student contact annually compared to more than 14,000 in Beijing). Its focus is narrower geographically, but it has been active in the production of new materials. Most recently, it has produced video taped introductions to student life in the United States. The Shanghai USIS post worked closely with this center in that production.

C. The Role of USIS in China

As described above, USIS has played an active role in the development of advisory services in China. Its role in China has been quite different than that which it plays in other countries. Since, with the exception of the USIS post in Guangzhou, Chinese nationals cannot easily gain access to USIS facilities and since the Chinese government has determined that single country advising centers are not appropriate in China, USIS has attempted to encourage the development of indigenous Chinese advising services. Even without the restriction imposed by the host government, the size of the country coupled with the extremely large number of potential students would in themsleves necessitate such an approach.

Although the post has been supportive of advising services, based upon observation and the comments of the Ambassador and the Public Affairs Officer, USIS in China has seen the Fulbright program as its primary educational exchange effort. That program, until recently the largest solely U.S. government funded Fulbright program in the world, is an important and visible effort.

The delegation recognizes and values the Fulbright program. Nevertheless, we believe that it would be in the best interests of U.S. universities and the overall exchange relationship between the two countries if there was some additional or re-allocation of effort in the Beijing post. This would allow more attention to be given to issues and problems which effect the many thousands of Chinese students and scholars who go to the U.S. annually. If a reallocation of effort were to take place, we propose the following for consideration:

Recommendations:

Since the CSCSE has the institutional position which would allow it to play a leading role in the development of advising services in China and since it is developing into an active provider of services, effort should be made to strengthen its role and status both inside and outside of China. The USIS post in Beijing could 1) provide evidence to the Chinese side of the U.S. commitment to student advising as a necessary component of the education exchange relationship; 2) encourage expansion of advising services in other areas in China; and 3) insure a sustained, cost effective approach by building a new long-term plan for the development of advising services across China in close cooperation with the CSCSE. The following suggestions might provide a beginning for such a plan:

1. NAFSA, through this report and through its newsletter, should encourage U.S. colleges and universities to send informational material to CSCSE. This effort could be encouraged if arrangements can be made so that materials can be sent to CSCSE through the USIS post.

2. The USIS post should allow the CSCSE to distribute the annual additions to the MRB (e.g. the Peterson's Guides, etc.). This would give the CSCSE the leverage necessary to open those collections which are effectively inaccessible or to shift this valued collection to other units where it would be accessible. It could encourage other advising centers to participate in CSCSE sponsored training activities.

The CSCSE, in return, should be asked to report to the post regarding this distribution and any information which they might have regarding usage and accessibility of those materials.

3. Ways of encouraging continued training of staff, both of CSCSE staff and of other centers' staff, should be explored and encouraged. The existing U.S. based training program for overseas advisors should be routinely used. Again it seems reasonable to involve the CSCSE in the selection of participants.

Other training possibilities do exist. For example, the training and follow-up programs to be run by the America Bound project of IIE/Hong Kong could be a valuable experience for Chinese student advisors. It could, at relatively low cost, provide exposure to a well-established advising center and allow the Chinese advisors to see experienced student advisors at work.

4) Since the Shanghai advising center has been fairly active and is in a position to serve a large number of students, its further development should be encouraged.

5) Although the CSCSE probably provides the greatest opportunity for long-term progress, other less official channels should be explored and perhaps encouraged as they are discovered. One example is the Western Returned Students Association. The Beijing chapter of that organization, which boasts 5,000 members, was the recipient of the library of the IIE Guangzhou advising center when that center closed. Groups like this, which have some potential for reaching a different audience, should be encouraged.

NAFSAns and USIA/USIS officials need to work together to communicate to Chinese policy makers the importance of the overall exchange relationship and the importance of student advising services to the continued health and development of that relationship. NAFSA would like to work with USIA and the post in Beijing in the development of a more effective means of communicating between China and NAFSA's member universities. The exchange process would be greatly facilitated if NAFSAns would learn of changes in Chinese exchange policy or practice much earlier than in the past. When problems or new issues are discovered by U.S. universities, NAFSA needs a quicker way of communicating those concerns back to China and seeking resolution or response from the Chinese authorities.

III. Student Flows to America: New Rules and Big Numbers

Visa issuance data provided by the Beijing consulate together with preliminary information on campus arrivals indicate that student flows have increased, rather than decreased, since the implementation of the new regulations. (See Appendix E for visa issuance rates.)

The new rules require that students must have worked in China for five years after graduation before they can receive a passport. The rules have three exceptions:

(1) Students who withdraw from university before the beginning of their fourth (or senior) year are exempt from the work rule.
(2) Students who have a direct relative overseas (father, mother, grandfather or grandmother) are also exempt from the work rule.

(3) Students who have an indirect relative overseas (includes brother, sister, uncle, cousin, etc.) may pay in lieu of the five years of work.

Although the new rules are deterring some Chinese students from coming to the U.S., the overall flow of self-sponsored students to American universities appears to be rising, not falling. Many passports are being issued to students, and the case load for F visas at the U.S. consulates is growing. Said one veteran American official in Beijing, "The only firm rule about student flow from China is: no matter what happens, the visa lines never get shorter."

The Chinese government has set new policies in place which it hopes will reduce uncertainty and stabilize the process of applying to study abroad for years to come. The implementation of the new policies is in effect the adoption at the national level of various rules which many local authorities had already established. The regulations clearly restrict young people, but in the process, they more clearly permit older college graduates who have repaid their education to the state to leave China for further study. U.S. institutions also have encouraged the greater use of the I-20, often the most appropriate visa, despite a common preference for the IAP-66 among Chinese students, scholars and government officials.

A. The New Regulations and the Flow of Students: A Look at the Numbers

In the summer of 1988 (June, July and August) about 2,000 F-1 visas were issued from the five consulates (see Appendix H). In the summer of Tiananmen, that jumped to about 3,300. In 1990, the first summer after the five year rule, about 4,000 F-1 visas were issued. The numbers of student visas are clearly higher after the restrictions than before.

As the case load for F-1 student visas is rising, so too are the issuance rates. In Beijing and Shanghai, which issue by far the most visas given their more highly educated population base, the issuance rate is about 55% to 60%. The Guangzhou consulate, which serves the region in China with the strongest emigration pattern to the U.S., approves approximately 20% of its F visa applications. Overall these rates of approval are higher than prior to June 4, 1989. One speculation is that some of the higher quality students and scholars who would have applied for J visas before the new rules are now switching to the self-sponsored route in view of the greater difficulties in gaining approvals for sponsorship from their universities.

In Shanghai, the education authorities reported increases in self-sponsored students going to the United States.

Year	F-1 visa approvals in Shanghai
1988	1069
1989	1263
1990	1632*

(* The 1990 figure was for the first eight months. They predict the full year number to be about 2,000. This would be a 100% increase in two years. Given that this increase already reflects the new rules, one can only wonder what the out flow rate would have been without them.)

F-2 visa issuance has gone up significantly since June 4th. Whereas about 75 F-2s were issued monthly before June 1989, about 200 per month were issued for the rest of 1989. In 1990 the average monthly issuance is well over 300. The U.S. government has emphasized the value of family unification in deciding these cases.

B. Dropping Out to Study Abroad

A strong majority of the Shanghai F students are going to graduate schools in the U.S., although about a quarter enter undergraduate programs. Since the new rules, over 400 students were reported to have

withdrawn from Shanghai universities and applied for transfer to American undergraduate programs. This appears rather high given the short time students have had to adjust to the new rules. In Guangzhou, the percentage of transfer students in the F visa line has doubled from about 8% to 17%. U.S. consular officials look carefully at whether the transfer shows a natural progression of study. Most withdrawals come in the third year; very few in the first or second. If a student withdraws, but fails to get a visa or otherwise cannot go abroad, according to information available at the time of the delegation visit, he or she could re-enter the university the next year.

Chinese officials professed to be unconcerned about this drop-out pattern. They say, for example, that 60% (or about 2 million) of the qualified students who pass the exams cannot attend university due to lack of places. The talent pool in China remains very large compared to the capacity of the tertiary system to educate them. Nevertheless, with students dropping out after 3 years of college education, many senior level classes are undersubscribed. In an effort to get around this problem some universities are establishing contracts with first year students to keep them through their complete degree programs.

C. Relatives Overseas

The overseas relative factor is becoming more important in the private student flow. This is especially true in the south, but also in Shanghai and east China as well. Of the 2000 students which the Guangdong Higher Education Bureau has approved since February for study abroad, about half have exempted themselves through overseas relatives. In Shanghai, about one in four were exempted from the five year rule through relatives. About 5% had direct relatives and therefore did not have to pay. Just over 20% had indirect relatives, and therefore could pay in lieu of working.

Each province has an overseas Chinese Affairs office of some kind. Students have to demonstrate to them their connection to overseas relatives. Birth certificates and other such documents are often hard to get in China. Rumors circulate that people are discovering new relatives overseas for the purpose of study abroad, but we could not verify this.

D. Financing Departure

New payment procedures are getting sorted out. Those with indirect relatives pay 2,500 RMB (US$550) for each year of masters level education, and 6,000 RMB (US$ 1,300) for each year of doctoral training received in China. In theory this is a bond which can be reclaimed upon return to China.

Payment should go to the university, although it is not clear to what extent the workunit in which the graduate is assigned may receive such funds. We hear reports of workunits (danwei) that wish to be compensated for the departure of a university graduate for overseas study. However, the Higher Education Bureaus certify that a student has or has not served the five years based simply on the length of time since graduation. Even so, the applicants for overseas study who have already been assigned to workunits have to negotiate with the personnel officials in their danwei about the terms of disengagement, whether before or after the five years have been served.

One of the ironies of the restrictions is that the establishment of rules which allow people to leave their danwei to study abroad have been made more firm, a legitimate path to overseas study has been created for those who qualify. For all the people in their 20s who now do not qualify to go abroad, there are many more who have already worked for five years or more since graduation and who now have a bureaucratically clearer path to the exits.

Given the length of time it takes to arrange study in the United States, including admission and financial backing, many who were in line to leave as self-sponsored students were already in the late 20s or early 30s. The rules say more clearly both who cannot go, and who can go. College graduates five years out of school can now go to their danwei with state regulations in hand and say more convincingly that they should be eligible to leave for overseas study.

Ironically, Chinese university faculty who gain admission and financial aid from the United States for graduate programs in America are now more likely to go as F-visa students, without the two year rule, than before the new rules were announced. In the past, these people were often obliged to "sign up" with their university as officially sponsored students, even though they were essentially self-financed, in order to put them on J visas. These visas were easier to get, and had the two year return rule which made it harder to change their visa status.

This hybrid type of exchange student was called "zi-fei gong-pai" (see the glossary for definitions of Chinese words) and gave many American foreign student advisors headaches as to which forms, IAP-66 or I-20, should be issued. This category is likely to diminish and allow us to return to a more straightforward pattern of F visas for degree students and J visas for non-degree visiting scholars. The latter may extend up to three years but cannot convert to degree student status.

B. Growth in TOEFL Takers and Scores

The TOEFL test has also grown under the new restrictions. Rumors last fall that the TOEFL exams may be suspended caused many to try to get in under the wire. The new rules have helped to dispel those rumors and things have returned to a more normal pattern. But normal in this case appears to mean massive growth. The State Education Commission of China reported to our delegation the following numbers of examinees:

	TOEFL	GRE	GMAT
1988	26,460	5,800	300
1989	50,000	15,000	600
1990*	50,000	12,000	800

(*The 1990 figure, it should be noted, only reflects the first half of the year. At the current rate, the number of TOEFL examinees will double in 1990 over last year, which had doubled over 1988.)

According to Chinese officials, in the past nine years Chinese students have taken 180,000 TOEFL exams, 40,000 GRE exams, 5,000 GMAT exams, and 500 TSE exams. They view a "normal pattern" to be about 20,000 to 30,000 TOEFL exams each year after the new rules have stabilized the "study abroad fever". Evidence of this normalcy remains to be seen.

Chinese TOEFL scores have gone up over the past decade. The average score in 1981 was 514. The average score in 1990 so far is 547. This, they claim, is in spite of the fact that many in the past year were not prepared to take the test but felt they had to take their chances regardless. Of a sample of 1,000 TOEFL takers, 43.3% were undergraduate students, 32% were graduate students, and 9% were teachers.

F. Types of Sponsorship and the Regulations that Apply

1. The Gongpai (Officially Sponsored)

Gong-pai means "officially sent". It refers to someone who is dispatched on behalf of public interest. Gong-pai scholars are selected and funded (at least in part) to study abroad. In contrast, a self sponsored (zi-fei) student is permitted to go abroad, and goes on his/her own resources and arrangements. The rationale and the procedures are quite different, as shown in the "Three Pathways" diagram in Appendix F.

Since 1986 the SEDC has wanted to change the kind of person they could send abroad as gongpai. They prefer visiting scholars who are older and more established professionally in China. These people would spend shorter periods overseas and study subjects with direct application to China's needs for economic and academic development. The SEDC wished to redue the number of younger gongpai who

went abroad for lengthy periods for graduate degrees. By 1986 it was already clear that return rates for these gongpai students would be low.

But making this change was difficult. Chinese students wanted degrees, and American universities were more willing to offer financial assistance for degree study. Due to a special agreement made by the two governments in the early 1980's, many Chinese academics who began their sojourns in the U.S. as visiting scholars could later convert to degree status even on the J visa. The American universities wanted to assess their qualifications for graduate degree study from direct contact as visiting scholars, and the Chinese government preferred the J visa with its two year rule as an incentive to return.

This set the pattern for the use of gongpai as a transition for degree study. Many gongpai visiting scholars came with one year of Chinese official support with the goal of funding their subsequent study on American sources. Now many of the visiting scholars cum degree students on J visas who arrived in the U.S. before April 11, 1990 have the option of converting to F visas before January 1, 1994 when the deferred departure program is due to expire.

So even though the official policy on both sides changed in 1986, the practice of using the gongpai route for degree students continued. In late 1989, however, after Tiananmen and the Bush/Pelosi amnesty for Chinese students, the SEDC closed this loophole. The grants now available for gongpai study abroad are go almost exclusively to older, established scholars who will spend about a year as visiting scholars, and then in theory, go home.

The SEDC assumes that this group will come back in greater numbers than their younger colleagues. They also believe that the knowledge they gained abroad will be more applicable to China's conditions and needs. The new gongpai are generally between 35 and 50 years of age and have more personal and professional stake in China. They are a lower risk for non-return. In light of the severe rates of non-return so far Chinese university leaders place a high priority on retaining junior faculty.

As the profile of gongpai shifts, so do their numbers. In contrast to the increase of self-sponsored F-visa students since Tiananmen, the flow of officially sponsored, J-visa scholars has decreased. In the peak months of June, July and August of 1988, the U.S. consulates issued about 3,500 J-1 visas. In the troubled summer of 1989, J-1 visas dropped by a third to about 2,400. By 1990, the first summer of the new rules, the three month count of J-1s fell another 50% to about 1,200.

The number of J-2 visas issued to spouses of gongpai has remained rather stable throughout this three year period. Before June 4th, the average monthly issuance rate was about 250, or easily four times the rate of F-2s. By the summer of 1990, the consulates were granting about 300 F-2s and about 300 J-2s each month. Given the general approach to favor family unification, one might expect F-2s to continue rising as F-1 visas rise, and J-2 visas decline with the descending J-1 curve.

Comparing summer 1988 and summer 1990, about 2,300 fewer J visas were issued, but about 2,000 more F visas were granted. While the composition and profile of America bound Chinese students and scholars have changed considerably in this period, the overall numbers work out to what the Chinese tend to call, "cha bu duo" (about the same).

2. Central Gongpai and Local Gongpai

Central Gongpai

There are two pathways to gongpai, central and local. (See Appendix F)

Central gongpai number about 3,000 each year for visiting scholars, and about 1,500 for short trips such as to international conferences. Only about 20% of the 3,000 have been sent to the U.S., but over half of 1,500 tend to go to academic meetings in America.

The Chinese government has maintained that they have not closed the door on exchanges. Indeed, the

3,000 per year level has remained constant since the mid 1980s. But the review process has changed. During most of the 1980s, the SEDC gave quotas to the universities, especially favoring the 36 key universities under their direct management. Academic and political reviews were done mostly at the university level. The SEDC processed the papers.

Beginning last year, the SEDC introduced a national peer review system for central gongpai. As they replaced younger students with older scholars, they replaced a national exam with a peer review system for research proposals.

Universities are asked to nominate to the SEDC about twice the number of candidates as their quota. Each university uses its own competition rules. The SEDC assembles the proposals and distributes them to review committees for each field. Each proposal is ranked by five person committees on criteria such as quality of the proposal, China's need for the research , academic background of the scholar, the necessity to go abroad to do this research, the strength or appropriateness of the designated overseas institution, and English language level (as measured by the English Proficiency Test (EPT)).

Each proposal gets an overall score, and is ranked by field. SEDC sets the numbers of grants for each field, and for each country of destination. As they lower the priority on grants for theoretical science or to a specific country, the competition in these categories goes up. This review procedure enables the SEDC to focus resources for overseas study on their priorities from year to year.

The central gongpai going abroad for the fall of 1990 were the second group to go through this review. The SEDC admits that the first year of the procedure, the year of Tiananmen, was rather chaotic. It remains to be seen how well it will work in the years ahead.

The peer review system reflects a effort by central bureaucracies to develop a national R&D policy and to use their resources targeted accordingly. Academic peer review gives the SEDC greater legitimacy at home and abroad. But this will work only if they are able to assure its integrity in organizations that have historically worked through back doors and personal relationships. If the new system works and the quality of the central gongpai remains high, the peer review can reduce concern abroad that the recent political changes in Beijing may have distorted the process with ideological/personalistic criteria for sending scholars overseas.

Local Gongpai

Local gongpai scholars go abroad under official auspices, but have little to do with the SEDC. They are funded and sponsored by a) provincial or municipal governments, b) the workunit itself if it has its own foreign currency, or e) in conjunction with overseas universities with whom Chinese universities have agreements. Another source d) may be private foundations abroad with direct links to Chinese universities. Some of these foundations have strong overseas Chinese donors, others do not.

Selection procedures vary according to funding source and sponsoring organization. There is often a bilateral decision process in which one side nominates and the other side accepts/rejects. Financial arrangements between the scholar and his or her danwei also vary. In the late 1980s many universities began using a written contract that spells out the terms of the overseas sojourn. In many of these contracts the housing registration (hukou) is retained, so that person studying abroad does not have to relinquish either permission to live in their current place of residence or access to any rationed services or amenities.

The danwei may pay international airfare, which on the national carrier can be paid in Renminbi, an unconvertable currency, but at rather high rates. Sometimes scholars find their own cheaper airfares with hard currency via Hong Kong or with help from friends in the States. Some scholars have been obliged to use some of their modest stipends while overseas to repay their employer for this and perhaps other costs on the Chinese side to going abroad. Such pay back arrangements may be off the books, and are difficult to document.

A significant percentage of the local gongpai scholars are funded by linkage agreements with American

universities. Thus Chinese institutions are keen to continue them, especially as other sources of funds for faculty training abroad may be harder to get. The suspension of some of these agreements over the Tiananmen period left some Chinese academics to wonder if American universities were obliged by their government to reduce their activities with China as part of America's official response to Tiananmen. This is further confused by misunderstandings of the relationship between the Fulbright program in China and the private, bilateral exchanges that American universities have with Chinese counterparts.

It is difficult to know how many local gongpai are going to the United States. SEDC officials have estimated from 2,000 to 3,000 per year. This is the bulk of the J visas. With stronger professional and personal ties to China, the approval rate for their J visas is about 80%. A major portion of the reduction in applications for J visas has come from local gongpai, some of whom are now more inclined to find their own ways out through self-funded arrangements on F visas. Thus the decline in gongpai is virtually made up by the increase in self-sponsored students on F visas.

The SEDC wants to close off the use of local gongpai grants for graudate study abroad, but their only major control point is the issuance of passports. Hurt by the brain drain, however, most local institutions are equally wary of sending younger faculty on degree programs abroad. Numbers are also down because money has been harder to get.

Local government and academic authorities are keen to point out that their open door is intact. According the Shanghai officials, for example, the 26 tertiary institutions in the city have a total of 126 linkage agreements with American universities. Every year about 100 Chinese scholars go to the U.S. as local gongpai on J visas. To this is added about 20 to 30 scholars to the U.S. who are sponsored by the city. Shanghai budgets about one half million US dollars for these exchanges. The eight key universities in Shanghai that are under the SEDC have a combined national quota of from 40 to 50 scholarships to the U.S. each year. The grants sponsored by the city tend to go to non-SEDC institutions.

Qinghua University in Beijing is a major sender of students and faculty. Qinghua reports that its sending of gongpai scholars abroad has increased since June 4th. From January to June 4th 1989, Qinghua sent 282 students and scholars abroad. In the remainder of the year, it sent 367. In addition, 123 junior faculty have gone as self funded students. Only 16 went as F-1 students in the first half of the year. In the first half of 1990, Qinghua sent 302 faculty to international conferences, 11 faculty as gongpai PhD students, and approved 116 to go overseas on F-1 visas. Over the past 10 years, Qinghua has sent about 1,000 students and scholars overseas, in both zifei and gongpai categories. Forty-four percent of them have gone to the U.S.

D. The Notarization of American Admissions Documents: The Case of the Rapidly withdrawn Regulation

For awhile this spring it appeared that another PRC regulation had been added to those governing the departure of Chinese students. Upon hearing of the implementation of a lengthy notarization process, NAFSA representatives visited the Chinese Embassy. Shortly thereafter a letter stating NAFSA's objections was sent to the Embassy. At the time of our arrival in Beijing there had been no reply to our letter of June. At the State Education Commission we followed up on our discussion with the PRC Embassy staff in Washington D.C. on the issue of the notarization of all admission documents and NAFSA's stated objections to that policy.

We noted that since June requests by Chinese students for notarization had diminished so that very few requests were being reported. SEDC officials noted that this policy originated with the Public Security Bureau and the NAFSA letter had been forwarded to them. They also noted that the intent of the notarization process was not directed at U.S. universities or colleges and that it was probably not necessary. We were left with the clear impression that this regulation set forth in March of 1990 would no longer be requested of U.S. institutions or of Chinese attempting to be admitted to them. The matter of the notarization process was apparently closed.

It is important to note that in our discussions with the SEDC we raised the issue of notarization and its relation to the return issue. We suggested that this additional requirement was viewed by the Chinese students scholars abroad as evidence that the Chinese government was not serious about its open door policy, but used such devices to discourage students from attempting to study abroad. This regulation, although apparently no longer operative, along with the "Five Categories" of Chinese students in the U.S. has served to broaden the gap between Chinese students and scholars and the Chinese government. It has served only to exacerbate an already tense relationship.

IV. The Guards at the Gate: Amerian Policies Regarding the Awarding of Visas to Students, Scholars and their Dependents

A. US/China Visa History: 1978 to September 1990

At the outset, the flow of Chinese students and scholars from the People's Republic was characterized by exceptional treatment when compared to students and scholars from other nations. The most notable example was with the use of the J-1 Exchange Visitor Visa.

When educational exchanges were opened up in 1978, both sides were eager to start educational exchange as soon as possible and as rapidly as possible. However, in order for Chinese students to qualify for admission to most US universities and colleges, testing programs had to be established in China which would evaluate Chinese students according to recognized criteria. Since most Chinese students would be at the graduate level, the GRE and TOEFL testing programs were established to facilitate the admissions process. Both examinations were required to establish qualifications for admission to most U.S. universities and colleges. Nevertheless, Chinese and Americans were impatient to begin exchanges. While the test administration details were being worked out, Chinese students came to the U.S. in the J-1 Exchange Visitor visa under the category of "Scholar/Researcher". Under regulations governing that visa, changes of category from "Scholar/Researcher" to "Student" were prohibited. Nevertheless, Chinese travelling to the U.S. were permitted to enter as a "Scholar/Researcher" and after having improved their English and established other qualifications for admission to degree programs, were then allowed to change their J-1 Exchange Visitor category to "Student". This exceptional procedure continued until the spring of 1986. At that time both sides agreed that Chinese who intended to be students should be processed like students from other countries. By then the testing infrastructure was in place in China. Chinese were informed about this change in policy; by 1987 the J-1 scholar/researcher category was no longer used as a vehicle for entering the U.S. to become a student.

During this same period, U.S. universities and colleges also generally agreed to issue the IAP-66 to Chinese students who were receiving teaching or research assistantships. Policy regarding this does vary across higher education institutions but, generally, unless a student is sponsored by some U.S. or foreign government agency, the form I-20 is issued. Universities and colleges were eager to normalize admission processes with China. From 1986 onward, fewer IAP-66's were issued to Chinese receiving assistantships. Up to June 4, 1989 then, the issuance of visas to Chinese students and scholars was no longer exceptional.

After June 4, 1989, the situation changed again. In December, President Bush issued an Executive Directive extending certain options to Chinese citizens in the U.S. That Directive was changed to an Executive Order on April 11, 1990. Essentially, the text of that document allows Chinese on J-1 visa to adjust status to another non-immigrant visa or immigrant visa if they qualify. Chinese citizens are free to return to China if they so desire. The Executive Order simply offers alternatives which are in effect until January 1, 1994. For Chinese who lose their immigration status while in the U.S. there are other options which allow them to remain in the U.S. until January 1, 1994. Presumably, prior to that termination date, the President will review the Chinese situation and either extend the order or let it expire on that date.

All Chinese students and scholars and their dependents who enter the U.S. after April 11, 1990 are

subject to the regulations of the visa they used to enter the U.S. The Executive Order does not apply to these Chinese citizens.

B. Criteria for Student Visas

The delegation met with representatives of the U.S. Consuls in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. Some differences exist between the posts as they review applications for various visas. The following is a summary of the discussions the delegation had with the Consul and Vice-Consuls assigned to these posts. The reader should keep in mind that personnel in consular posts change periodically, and that the philosophy in implementing visa regulations may vary, particularly in making decisions about borderline cases.

The total number of student visas (F-1) issued in China this year has increased at each of the posts. The number of J-1 visas issued has diminished. This phenonomen can be explained in part as a result of the policy of many U.S. institutions of issuing the Form I-20 to students who receive university financial support. The decrease in J-1 visas also results from changes in Chinese exchange policy as described in Section II. The refusal rate for issuing F-1 visas is largest in Guangzhou.

The increase in the number of F-1 visas implies that passports are readily available to students. There is the impression that the work units are approving student requests for passports even in cases where applicants who are subject to the five-year rule have not satisfied the requirement. This may be a result of confusion about the application of the rule, influence an individual or his/her family may have, the delivery of extra payments or other factors.

In addition to providing evidence that one is not abandoning his/her residence, the following specific criteria were discussed:

-**Quality of academic background.** Generally this is not a problem in Beijing, but the Consul will usually review the educational record and look for large inconsistencies between the transcript, test scores, and the academic reputation of the institution attended. The rejection rate on these grounds is considerably higher in Guangzhou than either Beijing or Shanghai.

-**Appropriateness of academic background to degree objective.** If a radical change in course of study is proposed, the applicant will be asked to justify his/her educational objectives in the U.S. and how they relate to previous training.

-**Inconsistent test scores.** TOEFL, GRE, and GMAT test scores are reviewed to determine, in a very general way, their accuracy. How well does a person with a 600 TOEFL communicate in English? Is the GRE score consistent with the applicant's previous academic background?

-**Sound financial support.** Funds which are committed from private sources in the U.S. or from other areas are screened carefully to consider the income, the number of dependents, and other obligations of the sponsor. The source of income is generally the most important factor. The Affidavit of Support (I-134) is carefully reviewed.

Questions have been raised in some quarters about the availablility to students of U.S. funds from Chinese banks. Ms. Flagerty of the Beijing Embassy is in the process of contacting the Bank of China for information about this issue and if funds are accessable, under what circumstances. (At the time of publicationi NAFSA was working on obtaining an update on this situation. Please contact the NAFSA office in Washington if information on the transferability of funds is needed.)

Much of the U.S. Consul's screening is designed to identify fraud not to second guess the university or college admission process. Consulate officers look for inconsistencies in the papers submitted for visa review. When fraudulent credentials are found, the school which issued the I-20 is notified at the earliest possible time which may be several weeks or months.

C. I-20 Issues

All the posts stressed the importance of providing the student with an I-20 as early in the process as possible. In China, students need to allow at least 2 to 3 months after receipt of an I-20 to obtain a passport, complete the visa application process, and other necessary clearance procedures. Students who plan to study in science and technical subjects require 5 working days to clear their visa. Students in the social sciences and humanities can usually be cleared and issued their visa the same day. Colleges and universities need to issue and send I-20's earlier.

A suggestion was made that a FIXED final date after which the school will not enroll the student be included on the I-20. Another alternative for an I-20 issued late is to include the dates of registration and the first day of classes in the remarks section.

D. Visa Issuance for Dependents

Considerable time was spent on this issue as many university personnel and Chinese students feel that dependents find it extremely difficult to obtain a visa to enter the U.S. Delegation leader Richard Downie delivered a list of 250 dependents and others who were alleged to have been denied a dependent's visa. The list demonstrated the delegation's concern that the spirit of the President's Executive Order which encourages family reunification may not have been administered in a consistent manner throughout China for those students and scholars in the United States after June 4, 1989, but before April 11, 1990. It was noted and agreed that those arriving after April 11, 1990 were subject to the existing regulations in each visa category.

All the posts indicated that they were loosening up on the intending immigrant issue for dependents whose principal was in the U.S. prior to April 11, 1990. Spouses and children younger than 16 (those usually considered dependent upon the family) are routinely given a dependent visa if they met the criteria discussed below:

-**Demonstrate relationship** with the principal in the U.S. Marriage Certificates, birth certificates of children and other documents are essential and should be taken with the applicant to the U.S. embassy/consulate when making visa application. Marriage by proxy is not acceptable to either the Chinese or the U.S. government.

-**Inadequate financial support** is the grounds for the largest number of rejections. The Beijing consulate wants evidence of continued source(s) of support, and not just a bank statement. Employment by the University or an affidavit of support are preferred. Dependents of students with assistantships or other means of on-going income are likely to be issued dependent visas. The SOURCE of income is important.

-Is the **principal in status?** This may be an ambiguous point given the current range of "status" classifications of Chinese in the U.S. today. It is recommended that where a student is in valid student status, the university provide documentation in the form of a letter or transcript. The student who is not "in status" or whose status is about to change or lapse should apply to the INS to obtain an "advance parole" form I-512 before departing from the United States. (See Appendix I)

-Is it **really family reunification?** When is the student due to return home? Dependent visas will not be issued to allow the family to tour the United States before the student leaves to

come home. Generally evidence for a minimum of one additional year to complete the degree program (or educational objective) is needed to qualify for a dependent visa. Individual family members applying for a visa separately are more likely to be rejected than when the spouse and child(ren) apply together. The latter is viewed as family reunification.

-**Letters of support** from University officials are not required but can be helpful if they address the above issues.

In Beijing a "soft refusal" (i.e. financial or proving relationship) can be reviewed when the material is available. A "hard refusal" (i.e. intending immigrant) must wait 1 month after the first rejection and 2 months after the second refusal. In Guangzhou, new evidence may be submitted at any time, but a second interview will only be conducted if the interviewer considers the supplemental information significant to the original reason for denial.

Children who are 18 or older are considered adults, and must qualify on their own merits for a visa. They are intending students and must demonstrate that they are admissible to an appropriate college or university. Children who are 16 or 17 (the age may vary between consulates) are screened very carefully. They are encouraged to complete secondary school in China and take the college entrance examination. The implication was that there is very little available for this age group in the U.S. except to attend school. There is a very strong reluctance to issue a F-1 visa to a high school student.

There does remain some concern about attitudes toward dependents ages 16 or 17. The Consuls attitude is to look at these requests on a case-by-case basis and try to determine probablilty for return. The Consuls generally felt that students who were about to complete secondary school were not good risks and would be denied a dependent visa. The expense of undergraduate education in the U.S. prevents most Chinese students from supporting their children at this level.

E. Tips on Working with the U.S. Consulates

•A numbering system is in place at the embassy in Beijing where everyone of all nationalities must wait for a visa interview. At the time of our visit in September, 1990 they were about two days behind. The system regulates the flow of traffic and let applicants know the day of their interview. The Guangzhou office works on a first come first serve basis. All visa applications for permanent residence in China are serviced in Guangzhou. Interviews are scheduled for applicants.

•Guangzhou has the largest number of fraudulent documents and has a vice-consul working on fraud on a full-time basis. Much of these efforts are directed at the permanent resident process.

•A visa will not be issued to a community college applicant who plans to transfer to a four-year institution. The financial requirement will be different, additional test scores are needed, as costs will increase. Applicants are told to come back with their admission to the four-year institution.

•Visa re-issuance after a brief stay in China is fairly automatic if finances are in order with appropriate evidence, and a signed page 4 of the I-20 is available. Not required, but helpful is a transcript and a letter from the university stating that the student is in good academic standing.

•Individuals who have an approved Advance Parole (INS form I-512) will not be required to go to the U.S. Embassy or Consulate to obtain a new visa as long as the I-512 is valid. In the event it has expired, the individual will either have to request a renewal from INS in the U.S. or qualify for an appropriate visa. (See Appendix I)

•It would be helpful to have the number of transfer credits listed on the I-20. It helps to determine the period of stay required to complete the degree.

•The B-2 visa for a grandparent to help out with a young grandchild is appropriate where the mother is not a student, is not working, and the grandparent really is only needed for a limited period of time. Although not unanimous, it was usually felt that an older grandparent would be more likely to return to China. Other considerations are the number of children in the U.S., the number of family members remaining in China, the employment status of the grandparent, and other criteria to support return to China.

•FAX's are not considered secure in Beijing where the consul is very reluctant to accept FAX messages. Effective next year, the Beijing consulate does not plan to accept FAXED letters to extend I-20 dates. They have experienced too many examples of fraud. The consul is willing to look at alternatives. The Guangzhou consul requires a confirming FAX if the person cannot depart from China before the arrival date stated on the I-20. The FAX is attached to the I-20 which will assist the student in clearing INS at the port of entry to the U.S.

V. Chinese Students in the U.S.: The Prospect of Return

We came away from China impressed with how urgently many Chinese, especially at the university level, view the issue of return. At the same time we left on the Chinese a reciprocal impression that this issue will remain intractable as long as PRC students and scholars in the U.S. perceive conditions in their home country to be unacceptable. It was our feeling that the impetus for changing these perceptions has to come from within China. When they believe conditions are right, many students will go home of their own accord.

A. On Campus in China: University Development in the Face of Faculty and Student Shortages

Anxiety in China over the return issue is felt most clearly at the university level, where the responsibilities to instruct and administer are falling on a shrinking number of aging faculty and administrators. Whereas Chinese officials at all levels professed readiness to continue exchanges with the United States and to proceed with the "open door" policy of welcoming interaction with the rest of the world, Yu Fuzeng, Director General of the Department of International Cooperation at the State Education Commission, stated that from China's perspective educational exchange with the United States had been a failure because of the low rate of return and the inappropriate concentration of degrees in the theoretical sciences. Nevertheless, with the adjustments in the policies governing official sponsorship described above, the central government remains firmly in support of the open door in academic exchange, perhaps due to other policy considerations not related to education.
The policy is still in place at the top but university officials are having second thoughts about it unless they can get back the students and scholars whom they've sponsored over the years.

The low rate of return is a problem, as the figures demonstrate. Nevertheless, one aspect of the disappointing rate of return is the misunderstanding of the length of time needed to complete a Ph.D. degree in the United States. Examples of how widespread the Chinese universities feel the problem to be were numerous. To cite but a few:

-- Officials at Fudan University pointed out that the size of their budget appropriation from the State Education Commission (SEDC) in Beijing depends on the number of students they enrol. Enrolment, in turn, depends on the number of professors who teach. A certain level of faculty each year is expected to finish their degrees abroad and return to begin teaching. Hence an adverse chain reaction begins if the expected new arrivals fail to show up. Either class sizes swell and teaching loads expand or enrolments shrink and budgets must be cut.

-- One official at Beijing University put it in clear terms when he suggested that the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's and 1970's had cost China a generation of its best and brightest youth and now the return issue is threatening to cost them another.

-- Beijing University of Aeronautics has received back on time only 3 of 22 Ph.D. candidates it sponsored to go abroad in its faculty development program.

-- The average age at the physics department faculty at Beijing University is 53. In the words of one official "we're lacking the whole middle generation. Every year we have to ask 200 students who graduate from here to stay on to teach because we can't wait 20 years for those we sent abroad to return".

-- Fudan University has sponsored more than 1000 short-term undergraduate visiting scholars over the years of which 700 have returned to China while an even larger number of degree candidates sponsored by the university has failed to exceed a 14% return rate.

-- Zhongshan University in Guangzhou has sent 136 faculty members to the U.S. in ten years; only 6 have returned.

Time and again we were told that the problem doesn't end with the few universities we visited, all of which were nationally supported key universities. More than once, and especially forcefully at Beijing University, the point was made that the reputation of China's famous "key" universities gives them an advantage in dealing with non-return in that they are able to attract returnees who should actual return to other institutions to work. The result was said to be that less prestigious universities are less able to cope. Of course, the key universities send a disproportionate number of their students and faculty abroad in comparison with those at provincial and other institutions.

In somewhat of a contrast to the deep concerns we found amongst university administrators, national level officials urged patience for the majority to eventually return. One official candidly estimated he hoped for a 50% return rate; another administrator hoped for 60%. The thinking at the SEDC seems to be that staying on to continue studies is often reasonable. The SEDC maintains that its officials, and those at the Chinese Embassy in the U.S., are willing to cooperate -- as the record of the past few years shows they have been -- as long as students and scholars sponsored by the state continue to recognize that China wants them back and insists on their return. On at least one occasion, our delegation was told that the more patient long-range attitudes of the national SEDC do not always parallel the immediate needs of China's universities. The tolerance at the SEDC level might be due to other factors having to do with China's relations with its overseas Chinese population.

B. The Delegation's Position on Return

At the State Education Commission we were told that some schools and some professors in the United States do not really understand "the responsibility of sponsored students to return to China" and that some professors even encourage sponsored students to extend their stays in the United States. The SEDC hastened to add that "NAFSAns of course are clear on this issue but others may not be." A university president present at one of our SEDC meetings opined "Americans provide too much assistance in facilitating overstay." And Shanghai's Higher Education Bureau followed up comparing the U.S. return rate of 37% to the rest of the world's 54% by saying that university administrators get very upset whenever sponsored students or scholars extend their stay in the U.S. These protests against American treatment of the return issue were routinely followed up by an appeal to our delegation to persuade NAFSAns to in turn persuade Chinese students and scholars to return. Our general response to such suggestions was:

1. As a general principle, applicable worldwide, we believe an international educational exchange is not complete until the student finishes and returns home.

2. U.S. law does not force PRC students to stay in the U.S.

3. Most Chinese students and scholars would come home if they believed conditions in China were suitable.

4. Only China can change those conditions and the perceptions of its citizens abroad.

5. NAFSAns are powerless to change China and cannot act as a conduit between the Chinese government and its own citizens. Our influence goes as far as apprising students of their rights and responsibilities under U.S. law. For us to attempt to do more would be both unethical and futile.

C. Overstay vs. Non-Return

Complicating the return issue is the fact that so many Chinese define return and non-return differently than do their American counterparts. At Zhongshan University, the perception is that students with Chinese masters degrees should be able to complete their Ph.D.s within three years and those who stay beyond that length of time are counted among the non-returnees. Elsewhere, the general feeling at

China's universities is that four to five years plus an additional one to one-and-a-half years of post-doc research should be sufficient to obtain a Ph.D.

Our delegation indicated that these time frames are simply insufficient for most U.S. institutions.

More than one university responded that this was the period of time U.S. universities indicated to them on the I-20, which does indeed seem sometimes to be the case. To alleviate the cross-cultural tension being felt on the return issue, we suggest that U.S. university admissions offices make greater efforts to indicate on the I-20 the actual amount of time expected for the Ph.D. If the U.S. side has been too casual about this over the years, we may have inadvertently been fueling Chinese anxiety over the return issue. Given the Chinese side's definition of non-return, it is not surprising that the problem continues to grow. As we told the Chinese, the large majority of the 40,000 PRC students and scholars still in the U.S. are maintaining non-immigrant status. An article in the September 1990 issue of Hong Kong's "Bai Hsing" magazine, reporting on a survey of PRC students in the U.S. done by an association of PRC political science students in the U.S., reports that only 14.6% of China's 40,000 intend to stay in America permanently and that slightly more than 30% would like to return within 5 years if the conditions are right. We therefore may have more of an "extension of stay" problem than an issue of "non-return". The situation will change if and when much larger numbers finish their studies and either choose to adjust status or go home. This threshold is still not upon us but the next few years will be crucial.

D. Thoughts on Return: Chinese Students and the Decision to Go Home

The political, social, economic, and familial factors influencing the decisions of the PRC students and scholars on U.S. campuses as to whether and when to return were a major area of discussion. We sought to understand China's perceptions of these factors and to convey to the Chinese -- at all levels -- the often unflattering perceptions of the PRC students and scholars with whom several of our delegation members deal on a daily basis.

Several themes repeated themselves from one meeting to the next. We tended to emphasize the following two points:

- They're concerned with how they'll be treated when they return.
- Many more would return if they were assured that they had the right to re-exit.

Chinese education officials tended to make the following two points:

- The students overseas are not patriotic enough.
- They like the standard of living in the West and want to earn more money.

Communist Party politics has reasserted itself in the governance of China's domestic education system, as is discussed at greater length elsewhere in this delegation's report. Nevertheless, various forms of "patriotic education" have long been the case in preparing state-sponsored students and scholars for their overseas experiences. For instance the orientation curriculum even before June 4, 1990 at China's several centers for sending students abroad contained a segment on patriotic education. The claim that overseas students are not patriotic enough actually relates to the conviction of the PRC government that China's university students in general are not patriotic enough, which is the primary reason for sending the entire freshmen classes of both Beijing and Fudan universities to military academies for one year of patriotic education before beginning formal studies.

Thus, from the point of view of many Chinese officials, the failure of so many Chinese students and scholars -- especially those sponsored by the Chinese side -- to return at a predesignated time is a fundamentally unpatriotic act in the sense that the university, and by extension the nation, is denied a return on its investment in these people's talents for every day they do not return. The Chinese we met

were united in arguing that no reprisals would be taken against students who return; patriotism would not be an issue. Our delegation did not mention what we sometimes hear from PRC students in the U.S. that the PRC government suppressed a work by the playwright Bai Hua in the early 1980s known as "Bitter Love", the theme of which held that China is incapable of rewarding patriotism. But we did indeed suggest to our Chinese hosts that the perception of many PRC students in the U.S. is precisely that being patriotic in the current climate is potentially risky, as is return.

China's position on the risks of return is simply that they are non-existent. With the exception of their own self-criticism that the quality of life (housing, salaries, equipment, etc.) in China cannot match that of the developed world, not a single Chinese with whom we met would agree that return would somehow lead to persecution or other forms of discrimination. One official at Beijing University averred his institution enjoyed more intellectual freedom than those in the United States. Another university president professed a "love it or leave it" approach, but not even he suggested that returnees would be treated less well than anyone else; at the worst, they would get equal treatment, no special favors. Others framed the discussion in terms of what is being done --within China's limited capacities-- to give returnees better than average treatment.

The sense we conveyed to the Chinese was that the materialistic issues were less important to most potential returnees. These people grew up in China and have an intimate knowledge of living conditions there. To sully the motivations of PRC students by the allegation that they're more interested in their own economic prosperity distracts from the far more important issues of politics and re-exit.

1. Politics: The 5 Categories

A major deterrent to returning, we suggested, was a PRC document which reached the light of day in early 1990 that divided PRC students and scholars in the U.S. into five categories. The document called for various levels of support for patriotic students and various levels of struggle to be waged against the recalcitrant lower categories. Officials at the SEDC initially acknowledged and later flatly denied that categorization of overseas students is a policy that has ever been discussed, much less promulgated.

Alleged harassment of PRC students in the U.S. is linked to the categorization issue in that both serve to reinforce the repugnance and outrage that Americans and Chinese nationals in the U.S. alike have felt toward China since June 4, 1989. We did not discuss the harassment issue directly, since the U.S. State Department on June 25, 1990 testified to the U.S. Congress that "the available evidence of PRC activities, taken as a whole, does not reach the threshold of a consistent pattern of harassment and intimidation ... Actions by Chinese officials have been sporadic, often couched in veiled terms and subject to varied interpretations." But we did refer to harassment in the context of discussing the problem the Chinese government has in reassuring its overseas students that coming home is safe. As long as the perception exists, we argued, the students will not come home no matter what the policy is. On one occasion we counselled the Chinese that they simply vow to accept returnees unquestioningly, without even thinking of investigating their activities while in the United States. This might lead to a few 5th category students escaping the consequences of their actions, from the Chinese perspective, but it might also lead to the return of larger numbers of U.S. graduates.

2. Re-Exit

Chinese education officials with whom we met did not seem to think that re-exit would be a problem for those who return as long as finances could be found for the expense of the trip. In fact the point was made that it is sometimes easier for those who have returned once to leave again because they've proven that they'll return whereas those who haven't yet left and returned remain untested. Of course returnees should not expect to be given head-of-the-line privileges in terms of university funding but this restriction is uniform and not aimed at them personally. Those who are able to generate funds on their own for their travel are said to be able to obtain exit permits without difficulty.

We suggested to the Chinese with regard to re-exiting that students who wish to return should be able to obtain new PRC passports with five years validity and a PRC exit permit from the Chinese Embassy

in the U.S. before they return home (four papers are necessary for a PRC citizen to leave China: a plane ticket, a passport, a visa to a foreign country, and an exit permit). (See Appendix F for a chart of exit procedures.)

The Higher Education Bureaus in both Shanghai and Guangzhou suggested in response that PRC students in the U.S. might want to organize representative delegations of students and scholars to return to China for short visits -- with re-exit guaranteed and prearranged before departure from the U.S. -- to see for themselves.

Whether returnees will be exempt from political persecution and, in addition, will be able to re-exit with ease is something our delegation was unable to assess during our short stay. The Chinese officials with whom we met went to great lengths to suggest their policy on both issues is open and relaxed. Meanwhile, our delegation told our hosts that the perception in the U.S. is that return is not as uncomplicated as the government and the party would like it to be.

3. Perceptions

The quickest way to solve the return issue is to begin dealing with the perceptions outlined above. Propaganda will not suffice. In China a university president told us of a student of his who was studying in Oregon; his mother had succeeded in joining him there to take care of his child while he studied; when the mother became ill with a kidney stone and had to return to China to have it removed, the best the son could do was to escort his mother to the airport and put her on the plane in the hands of the airline attendants. This may not seem like much to American readers, but to Chinese such an unfilial act could only be warranted in the most extreme of circumstances. Obviously this student felt terrified of what might happen to him if he went home even for a short mission of mercy.

Nothing better illustrates the intractability of the return issue and the reason why PRC pronouncements which seek to reassure students are greeted with such derision. China's credibility problems with its students began with the way it interpreted events in the 1950s such as the unimaginably catastrophic "Great Leap Forward" that cost more than 20 million lives in a mass famine the likes of which the world has not since seen. The distortions continued in the 1960s with the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". Many in China and abroad hoped the distortions were on their way out during the decade after the elimination of the "Gang of 4" in 1976. Up until June 4, 1989, China enjoyed as high a level of credibility with its own people and with the rest of the world as it ever had. But the events of that horrible day and night, and the way China has managed the truth since then have left China's credibility in tatters. Perhaps it would begin to recover if and when the Chinese leadership ever began referring to Tiananmen as the tragedy it was instead of the "incident" they would prefer us to believe it was.

E. Implications for NAFSAns

NAFSAns should be concerned with some of the long range implications of continued non-return of PRC students who have finished their studies in the U.S. The prolonged residence in the United States of Chinese students and scholars is depriving Chinese colleges and universities of badly needed personnel. Opinions differ regarding the role of the Foreign Student Advisor in their presentation of the options to the students and scholars with whom they work. However, those who develop and implement professional guidelines should remain cognizant of their implications, both for China's development and for Sino-U.S. relations.

Alternatively, the potential non-return of large numbers of PRC students may have an even greater impact on U.S. campuses as the years go by and the number of Chinese in our midst continues to mount. It is now said to be at least 40,000 and several estimates suggest we are already at 50,000. If those numbers continue to be replenished by large numbers of Chinese students (14,000 in 1989, perhaps more in 1990) our universities could soon be populated by 100,000 or more PRC students and scholars. This could happen by the year 2000 even if the students began returning at the rate of 5,000 a year. Most of these students would be associated with our universities in some form of teaching or

research capacity, affecting instruction at both the graduate and undergraduate levels.

Other issues come and go in U.S.-China relations: Taiwan, family planning, arms sales, Tibet, etc. For the Chinese, we have seen that the "return issue" matters to them because they need human resources to carry out their plans for modernization. To Americans, especially NAFSAns who interact with so many PRC students on a regular basis, the issue of return is intricately tied to human rights. Our delegation endeavored to comprehend the Chinese position and convey it to NAFSAns with the same intensity that we attempted to tell the Chinese how deeply Americans feel about the issue.

It is indeed important that we appreciate the importance of return, from both sides. There are indeed grave implications to how the issue is being handled on both sides of the Pacific. But a discussion of the issue would not be complete without looking for a moment at the positive side of the issue.

First, it is important to understand that official anxiety over return is mostly limited to the scholars and students they've supported financially over the years. There is a clear difference in their minds between state-sponsored and self-sponsored. The Chinese believe they have sponsored approximately 30,000 students and scholars to the U.S. over the ten years since exchanges were reestablished. Of these, as many as 20,000 have returned; this number of course includes visiting scholars who went to the U.S. for short-term visits and returned. This is not a low rate at all, even though for some universities in China the non-return of a single professor poses unwanted problems.

Second, the Chinese now claim to be able to generate 2,500 Ph.D.s and 25,000 MAs every year. In rough numbers, this will soon be enough to satisfy their needs in many disciplines. International degrees will soon no longer be as vital to their success as they now are. Of course the long range viability of their universities depends on internationalization, but at least we should expect to see some of the pressure on PRC university level administrators being relieved within two to three years.

Thirdly, despite all odds, there is indeed a trickle of students and scholars returning to China. As China labors to improve its image among those who remain overseas and as students complete their degree programs, the numbers can only increase. And finally, the Chinese policy of who they send abroad now and for the foreseeable future focuses on short-term visiting scholars only, the type of individual most likely to return.

F. Return in Other Countries

Left unfinished on our agenda was the question of how to communicate to the Chinese the experience that NAFSAns have had with other countries on the return issue. This problem, after all, is not unique to China. Both developed and non-developed countries have had to face the issue in the years since World War II. The Chinese may be more sensitive because of the way the Cultural Revolution decimated their human resources and because Deng Xiaoping's highest priority remains the modernization of the Chinese economy, a feat the Chinese themselves claim they will be unable to accomplish without internationalization. But what of the experience of countries such as India, Korea, and Taiwan on the issue and how do those experiences relate to current conditions in China? The Chinese education researchers with whom our delegation members met in Beijing haven't yet begun to study this question. Perhaps this is an item for NAFSA's future agenda of relations with the State Education Commission and the universities of the People's Republic of China?

VI. PRC/US Relations and Educational Exchanges in the 1990s and Beyond

A. The Importance of Exchange to China

All the signals we have received on this trip point to the conclusion that an important component of China's educational strategy for years to come is its educational exchanges with the United States. There are at least three reasons to support this conclusion:

First, nearly all the SEDC officials and the university administrators made the point emphatically that China's policy of sending scholars and students to study abroad did not change in the 1980s , notwithstanding the Tiananmen Tragedy of June 1989, nor will it change in the future. Chinese officials' overall assessment of the impact of U.S./PRC exchange relations of the past decade is a positive one, acknowledging that many returned scholars and students have made significant contributions to improving the quality of the country's higher education. SEDC officials stated repeatedly that they would not do anything to turn back exchange relations with the United States.

Second, China's demand for well-trained people will remain very high for decades to come. China's long-term commitment to achieving the four modernizations has survived many major political and ideological crises since 1978. The ideas of reform and open-door have now become so firmly established in the public consciousness that probably even the ultraconservatives would find it hard to abandon them. Our Chinese hosts both at Beijing and in the provinces expressed the view that China cannot afford to close its doors and return to a situation of self-imposed isolation. There is widespread agreement that the goals of modernizing China can be realized only through cultural, scientific, and technological exchanges with the outside world on a massive and sustained basis.

Third, the U.S. will remain in a strong position to satisfy China's needs. To be sure, SEDC officials stated that they intend to change the distribution of disciplines that Chinese scholars and students will study abroad to suit the country's needs. They felt that China already has an oversupply of foreign-trained experts in the theoretical sciences (such as math and physics), and really needs more people in the applied sciences. Furthermore, SEDC's data purported to show that China would produce in 1990 25,000 masters and about 2,500 Ph.D.s and therefore had achieve self-sufficiency in meeting the replacement needs for faculty teaching and research in many fields. Accordingly, their new thinking is to send fewer college graduates to master's programs abroad, but more people as visiting scholars or post-doctoral training. However, SEDC's optimism was not readily shared by the university administrators of several campuses. Instead, they preferred to underscore the very serious difficulties in maintaining full-scale teaching or research programs in many disciplines on their campuses. The introduction of the 5-year work rule and other related restrictions on studying abroad have the effect of driving the highest-calibered college graduates away from their graduate programs.

It is now quite common for the universities to have few faculty members in the age bracket of 30-35 or even between 35-50 years of age. People above 50 years of age often constitute the majority of university faculty. If the students and scholars who went abroad in the 1980s do not start to return in the next 5 to 10 years, China's higher education may experience a serious decline in quality as the phenomenon of the "missing generation" becomes more aggravated.

From China's perspective, it is particularly important to strengthen exchange ties with the U.S. as China's reliance on the U.S. as a training ground will probably continue to grow. Since nearly half of China's scholars and students who have gone abraod for study have gone to the U.S., China's ability to achieve a more balanced flow of highly trained people to and from the U.S. will become far more important than China's exchange relations with other countries in the world.

In addition, both SEDC officials and university administrators readily acknowledged America's leading role in science and technology in the world. They pointed out further that the decentralized character of the American education system has made it possible for Chinese universities and students to obtain more generous financial and other forms of assistance from the U.S. than from any other country in the world. As long as these American advantages persist, the U.S. will be accorded a pivotal role in China's educational strategy.

B. The Importance of Exchange to the United States

This issue can be approached from several different perspectives. One is the amount of influence an expanding exchange relationship will give to the U.S. in China. If a substantial number of U.S.-trained students and scholars do return to China, they have the potential of playing very active roles in China's

scientific and technological community or even assuming leadership over China's modernization drive. The American educational experience in China in the 1920s and 1930s not only produced a generation of distinguished scholars and educators, but also diplomats, politicians, and experts in finance, communication and many other fields. It is quite conceivable for a new generation of U.S.-trained Chinese experts to exercise comparable levels of influence in Chinese society again.

Second, China is already the leader in a number of scientific fields in the world today. It would be beneficial for the US to be in a position so that its scholars and students can maintain normal exchanges and expand the scope of collaboration with their Chinese counterparts in education, science, and technology.

Third, America's ability to attract the largest number of Chinese scholars and students can also raise many new concerns. If the trend of the 1980s persists, the number of Chinese students and scholars coming to the U.S. will exceed those returning to China by a wide margin. While there are 50,000 Chinese students and scholars in the U.S. in 1990, what would happen if there were 100,000, a figure which is not unthinkable? How would U.S. universities cope with the financial and service burden imposed by a foreign student body of this magnitude? What effects would their presence have on the character of American graduate programs or undergraduate instruction, especially with reference to introductory courses on the freshman and sophomore levels?

In view of the fact that American colleges and universities are supporting Chinese scholars and students at the rate of $200 million a year now, how will the academic community and the general population react when this number grows much larger?

C. Areas of Friction

No international exchange program of major proportions can realistically expect to be free from frictions. In the case of U.S./China exchanges, the potential for friction is greater because of the relatively short history of their cooperative relations, the rapid rise in the number of people involved in exchange, and because of the enormous differences between their political/ideological systems, social customs and cultural assumptions.

At present, there appear to be two potential areas of conflict. One has to do with American scholars/students in China, and the other, Chinese in the United States.

Insofar as Americans in China are concerned, it is recalled that when the American academic community first entered into exchange relations with the PRC, there was little pressure to strive for a relationship of equal exchange. While individual American universities or scholars/students have benefited from their exchanges with their Chinese counterparts and, in some cases, may have found such exchanges to be indispensable to their own academic agenda, the experience of the 1980s as a whole has seen the development of a relationship of unequal exchanges with the major benefits going to the Chinese side.

In the years ahead, the success of China's policy of sending scholars/students abroad will depend on two factors. First, the Chinese must correctly identify their personnel needs. Second, they must be able to send their scholars/students to the appropriate American institutions or programs to be trained. But for U.S./China exchange relationship to prosper in the long run, China must also provide its American counterparts with greater incentive to want to continue this relationship. Up to now, the American academic community has not entertained any expectation that China will be able to extend any significant amounts of financial aid to Americans or that the PRC will help train Americans. As the exchange relationship enters the second decade many more American universities and colleges will scrutinize more closely the issue of what dividends they can draw from China. Even though only a limited number of American scholars/students now go to China for language or regular academic training, or for conducting research, they do expect the Chinese to give them assistance to the best of their ability. The number of such people may not grow rapidly in the next decade, but they are often taken as a bellwether of the quality of U.S.-China exchanges. This is especially true where formal

exchange relationships exist and where American institutions have made sizable payments to their Chinese counterparts, but have found the latter wanting in fulfilling their obligations. In the case with students, the most common complaints are that their living conditions and the quality of training they receive are both poor, or that they have been placed under multiple restrictions to fraternize with their Chinese students. In other words, the Chinese hosts are often more interested in making money than delivering good services and they need to be reminded that the exchange relationship must become increasingly more reciprocal.

Here the Americans are not asking the Chinese to provide the American students with treatment available on most American campuses, but only to ask the Chinese to make their best effort to fulfill their contractual obligations. The fact that many Chinese universities are suspected of making substantial profit in running the exchange programs without making a bona-fide effort to deliver their best services is an irritant that must be removed if a healthy exchange relationship between these countries is to be maintained.

With respect to scholars, the most common issue is usually the access to research materials and the freedom to conduct surveys, interviews, or make field trips. With respect to the Chinese scholars/students in the U.S., an issue that may poison the exchange relations is the suspected attempt by the PRC to tighten surveillence over Chinese scholars/students on American campuses. Whenever the Chinese political tension heightens within China, the government is tempted to exercise greater control and coercion over its citizens abroad. While the SEDC may not be actively involved in such activities, it will probably also has little power to prevent other branches of the Chinese government (such as the Ministry of Public Security) from doing so. The continuation of a constructive and beneficial relationship requires that the Chinese government refrain from the sponsorship of any activities which either infringe upon academic freedom on American campuses or violate American laws.

D. An Agenda for the Future

. . . since June, 1949, very few Chinese students have been able to return to China while only 120 came from China. . . according to estimates of University authorities and the Department of State there are probably about 3,000 Chinese students in varying degrees of financial need who might have to remain in the U.S. for the next three years. . . so far 2,885 applications from students in 430 colleges have been received for ECA and Emergency Aid. . .1,053 grants have been made. . . NAFSA NEWSLETTER, May, 1950

. . .a resolution was passed congratulating the Special Projects Section of the State Department's Division of Exchange of Persons on its able and considerate administration of the Chinese Grant-in-Aid program, with suggestions for adjustment of several policies: additional allowances for academic expense; provision for maintenance between summer and fall sessions of colleges on the semester system; increased allowances for married grantees; facilitation of transfers and progression to higher degrees. . .it was further urged that an effort be made to secure early announcement by the Attorney General of regulations concerning the employment of Chinese students. . .NAFSA NEWSLETTER, March, 1951

As these all too relevant quotes demonstrate, the anguish and alienation experienced by Chinese students on American campuses in the aftermath of the clearing of the streets of Beijing may be seen as a tragic repetition of events experienced in previous decades. Fortunately, American higher education still has the capacity to respond to abrupt shifts in policies affecting the flows of foreign students and scholars to the United States, as well as to absorb those left bereft of financial support. But as the number of foreign students on American campuses increases and relationships between American and foreign colleges and universities grow in depth and complexity, U.S. higher education has begun to recognize the need to manage its foreign relations, rather than to respond to events abroad.

In the mid to late '80s many representatives from American higher education strove to "normalize" the Sino-U.S. exchange relationship by demanding greater reciprocity in exchanges and by reducing the number of waivers of the standard immigration regulations offered to Chinese students and scholars. Today it is

clear that this goal will not be achieved in the near future. The Executive Order issued by President Bush on April 11, 1990 is the most salient example of the kind of exceptional effort required of foreign student services on university campuses to sustain academic exchanges between the United States and China. The large number of Chinese students on American campuses, the critical role these students play in many graduate programs, and the cataclysmic shifts orchestrated by the China's leaders in Beijing combine to make relentless demands upon those responsible for maintaining these exchanges.

However, the delegation's most important finding was that the volume of the exchanges, specifically the flow of Chinese students into American colleges and universities, is likely to continue undiminished. This conclusion appears counter-intuitive given the new regulations, including the five-year work rule promulgated in February, 1990 and the PRC government's shift away from the sponsorship of matriculated students in favor of older scholars staying for shorter periods of time.

In their assessment of the relationship between American and Chinese higher education, the delegation concluded that a number of steps need to be taken to ensure that this important relationship is enduring, mutually beneficial, and of high quality. Four areas of program development are necessary to develop the bilateral educational infrastructure needed to keep Sino-U.S. academic exchange viable:

1) Strengthening the Communications Between the Two Educational Systems through the Creation of a Post for an Educational Attache or an Independent Liaison.

Misunderstanding and confusion frequently result from interactions between the American and Chinese systems of higher education. Requests for American colleges and universities to return Chinese students and scholars to China, bewilderment over the number of students admitted to American universities but denied visas, and concern over scholars who spend over three years in the U.S. to complete doctoral programs represent some of the misunderstandings common among Chinese colleagues. Meanwhile, Americans are amazed when new regulations affecting exchange are issued without discussion, frustrated when they are unable to estimate how many of those admitted with scholarships will arrive, and angered by breaches in contracts believed to have been mutually agreed upon.

Representatives in American higher education need to understand the devastating effect the flow of talent to the United States is having on Chinese higher education, while officials in China need to recognize the implications of their own policy decisions in the deterioration of their educational infrastructure.

We believe that the creation of a post in China for a liaison on behalf of American higher education would help address issues as they arise and would facilitate the kinds of discussion necessary to bring about a gradual improvement in the academic exchange relationship. Current representation is piecemeal when carried out on behalf of specific programs or institutions and open to distortion when assumed by U.S. government officials, who tend to see exchanges through the particular lens of the Fulbright Program.

The higher education liaison could keep the Chinese higher education community abreast of the broader attitudes and concerns of the American academy, as well as of specific regulations, including admissions policies and practices and INS regulations, which might affect exchange. The liaison would also be responsible for communicating events, regulations and attitudes in Chinese higher education.

2) To facilitate the creation of programs which promote opportunities for professional development through travel abroad for students and scholars who have studied in the United States and returned to China.

This recommendation assumes that continued access to professional programs and opportunities will encourage students and scholars who might otherwise opt to remain in the United States to return to China. While NAFSA respects the freedom of all students and scholars to decide, within the realm of U.S. law, if and when to return to China, the members of the Association maintain that the ultimate goal of exchange is for students and scholars to return to their home country to complete the cross-fertilization process. Acknowledging that the conditions for scholarship and research in China will not compare with those in the United States in the near future, NAFSA advocates the establishment of programs that would

ameliorate the potential isolation that students and scholars might experience upon return.

3) Better access to information for Chinese students and scholars preparing to come to the United States. *

Thousands of students continue to enter the United States to study, ignorant of the American education system and uninformed about their own programs. Access to information is limited and tends to be confined to a few advising centers in major cities, several of which are in obscure locations or which are inaccessible due to their restricted hours. Advising centers in operation need both additional and more up to date materials. The hours and locations need to be made more accessible to students. New and innovative ways need to be found to reach students in metropolitan areas in the interior.

4) The placement of international educational exchange in its rightful context as both an instrument of foreign and domestic policy and as an integral part of the creation of a global network of intellectual exchange that transcends national interests.

Educational exchange and the migration of talent has had and will continue to have profound economic and social as well as intellectual consequences. The experiences of countries like Taiwan, Korea and Thailand demonstrate that a short-term drain in intellectual resources can eventually result in economic and cultural linkages with beneficial effects in the long-run. What were the most critical factors which leading to these constructive developments? What, if any, implications does this have for China? Are there specific policies which can be pursued on either side of the exchange process which facilitate these positive developments?

NAFSA proposes to convene a conference which would gather together scholars and administrators familiar with Sino-U.S. education exchange and with the experiences of other countries to examine these issues which dirctly affect the health of Sino-American educational exchange.

* See Decline and Renewal by Craufurd Goodwin and Michael Nacht, Institute of International Education (IIE) 1986.

APPENDIX

A

LIST OF DELEGATION MEMBERS

NAFSA China Delegation

MEMBERS:

Leader: Richard Downie, NAFSA President Emeritus
Chair, NAFSA China Advisory Committee
Director, International Student Services
University of Florida

David Horner
Director, Office of
International Students and
Scholars
Michigan State University

Robert Brashear
Director of Graduate Admissions
The Graduate School
Cornell University

Juliette Gregory, NAFSA
China Advisory Committee Liaison
NAFSA

Chi Hsi-Sheng
Professor, Political Science Dept.
University of North Carolina

Glenn Shive
Director, Institute of International Education - Hong Kong

Jay Henderson
Director for Southeast Asia and
Representative for China
Council on International Educational Exchange

APPENDIX

B

DELEGATION ITINERARY

ITINERARY FOR NAFSA DELEGATION TO CHINA
FALL 1990

September 8

Afternoon Meeting in San Francisco

September 9

Travel to China

September 10

Arrival in Beijing

September 11

Meetings with United States Information Service
and United States Embassy Officials

September 12 - 13

Two Day Conference on Sino-American Exchange
Meetings with Officials from the State Education Commission
Representatives from Beijing colleges and universities
The Beijing Bureau of Higher Education
The Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange
The Chinese Education Associaton for International Exch ge

September 14

Campus Visits in Beijing
Beijing University
Beijing Normal University - Institute for Comparative Education

Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange
Central Institute of Educational Research (CIER)

September 15

Flight to Shanghai
Meeting with repesentatives from the Shanghai Higher Education Bureau

September 16

Meetings with USIS and US Foreign Service Representatives
Shanghai International Studies Unversity
Fudan University - American Studies Center

September 17

Flight to Guangzhou

Meetings with Consul General and USIS Cultural Affairs Officers

September 18

Guangdong Higher Education Bureau
Campus visit to Zhongshan University

September 19

Train to Hong Kong

September 20 - 21

Debriefing, writing and discussion in Hong Kong.

September 22

Return to the United States

APPENDIX

C

LIST OF PEOPLE WITH WHOM THE DELEGATION MET

CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHOM
THE NAFSA DELEGATION MET
SEPTEMBER 11 - 19, 1990

State Education Commission, September 12 - 13

Teng Teng	Vice Chairman, State Education Commission
Yu Fuzeng	Director-General, Department of International Cooperation, State Education Commission
He Jinqiu	Director-General, Department of Overseas Studies, State Education Commission
Chen Kemiao	Division Chief of Policies Research, Department of Overseas Studies, State Education Commission
Li Yuxiu	Division Chief of American and Oceanian Affairs, State Education Commission
Zhang Xiuqin	Deputy Chief of American & Oceanian Affairs, Department of Overseas Studies, State Education Commission
Ma Jianshe	Deputy Chief, Division for International Students Affairs, Department of International Cooperation, State Education Commission
Wang Shengshui	First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America
Shen Shituan	President of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Shi Yuanchun	President of Beijing Agricultural University
Song Lijun	Beijing Municipal Education Bureau, Division of Foreign Affairs
Sun Shuyun	Beijing Higher Education Bureau
Ding Hongyu	Beijing Municipal Higher Education Bureau, Division of Foreign Affairs
Chen Zhengya	Beijing University, Division of Foreign Affairs
Cui Guowen	Qinghua University, Division of Foreign Affairs
Li Huan	Beijing Normal University, Division of Foreign Affairs

Wo Shuoxin	Deputy Director of Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange
Lu Zhen	Deputy Director of Chinese International Examination Cooperation Bureau (CIECB)
Xie Qigang	Secretary General, Chinese Education Association for International Exchanges
Gao Luduan	Deputy Secretary General, Chinese Education Association for International Exchanges

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General Meetings in Beijing

Gu Ming-yuan	Vice-President, Beijing Normal University
Wang Yingjie	Associate Director, Institute of Foreign Education, Beijing Normal University
Teng Chun	Vice Director-General, Central Institute for Educational Research
Meng Mingyi	Chief of Division of Higher Education, Central Institute of Educational Research

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Shanghai

Xu Kuangdi	Director, Shanghai Bureau of Higher Education
Gong Yuee	Deputy Director, International Exchanges Division, Shanghai Bureau of Higher Education
Feng Xu	Section Chief, Foreign Affairs Division, Shanghai Bureau of Higher Education
Lu Yiming	Director of International Programs, Fudan University
Zhou Minwei	Deputy Director, American Studies Center, Fudan University
Jiang Yaonan	Director, Shanghai Pre-Departure Training Center for the State Education Commission

Guangzhou

Zhou Heming	Vice Commissioner, Bureau of Higher Education, Guangzhou
Li Shujun	Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs Division, Higher Education Bureau of Guangdong Province
Li Rui	Zhongshan Medical University
Huang Qingwei	Huanan Normal University
Liu Yue	Jinan University
Wu Hongbao	Huanan Technical University
Hu Jian	Huanan Technical University

Meetings with U.S. Government Officials Based in China

James Lilly	United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China - Beijing
McKinney Russell	Cultural Affairs Officer, Embassy of the United States of America - Beijing
Tony Hutchinson	Program Officer, United States Information Service - Beijing
Sue Anne Flaherty	Second Secretary-Consul, Embassy of the United States of America - Beijing
Eric Jones	Second Secretary-Consul, American Consulate in Shanghai
Norma Harris	Director, United States Information Service, Shanghai
Olivia Hilton	Assistant Branch Public Affairs Officer
Dennis Harder	United States Consul General, Guangzhou
Nicholas Sherwood	Director of United States Consular Section, Guangzhou
Richard Stites	Director, United States Information Service, Guangzhou

APPENDIX

D

LIST OF CHINESE TERMS

GLOSSARY OF CHINESE TERMS

chujing (qian)zheng	exit visa; the documentation, in addition to a passport, which a citizen of the People's Republic of China needs to leave the country
danwei	organization or department; generally refers to the work unit with which an individual is affiliated
daxue	university or college
daxuesheng	university or college student
gongfei	publicly supported; generally refers to students or scholars who are supported by either the central government or a more localized state institution, such as the provincial government or the individual's work unit
gongpai	appointed or dispatched by the state; those students or scholars sent abroad on behalf of the People's Republic of China
hukou	account; refers to the official documents and ration cards which permit a person to live in their designated location
jiaoliu	exchange (jiaoyu jiaoliu - educational exchange)
jiaoyu	education
liuxue	to study abroad
liuxuesheng	a student who is studying abroad
zifei	at one's own expense; students who are supported either by themselves or by a foreign organization
zifei/gongpai	self-supported, but appointed by the state; those students who are not being supported by the state, but who are traveling abroad in an official capacity

PROPER NAMES

Guangdong Sheng Gaodeng Jaioyu Ju	Guangdong Bureau of Higher Education
Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui (Short term: "Jiaowei")	State Education Commission; the central authority in Beijing responsible for education
Shanghai Shi Gaodeng Jiaoyu Ju	Shanghai Bureau of Higher Education
Zhongguo Jiaoyu Guoji Jiaoliu Xiehui	Chinese Education Associaton for International Exchange
Zhongguo Liuxue Fuwu Zhongxin	Chinese Service Center for Scholarly Exchange
Zhongyang Jiaoyu Kexue Yanjiusuo	China Central Institute of Educational Research

APPENDIX

E

VISA ISSUANCE RATES

Consular Activity in the P.R.C.

F-1 Visa Issuance



* These figures were provided by the consulate office in Beijing. The final figures had not been released. (9/90)

Consular Activity in the P.R.C.

F-2 Visa Issuance



Consular Activity in the P.R.C.

J-1 Visa Issuance



* These figures were provided by the consulate office in Beijing. The final figures had not been released. (9/90)

Consular Activity in the P.R.C.

J-2 Visa Issuance



APPENDIX

F

EXIT PROCEDURES FOR CHINESE STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS

Three Pathways for Students and Scholars to Depart China for Study in the U.S.A.

Steps for Self–Sponsored Students

1. Take the TOEFL/GRE exam.

- approval letter from workunit
- obtain foreign currency to pay for exam

2. Seek and gain admission to an American university.

- receive I-20.

3. Negotiate terms with the workunit (housing, "hukou" registration, benefits, provisions for family who stay behind).

4. Get certification of having worked for five years beyond BA from the higher education bureau in one's city or province.

5. Apply for and get passport (light brown cover) from the local public security bureau.

6. Get F-1 visa from US consulate or embassy

7. Get exit permit from public security bureau.

8. Get air ticket and depart to USA.

IIE

Glenn Shive Ph. D.
Director IIE/China

September, 1996

2 Harbour Road, 12 Floor
Wanchai, Hong Kong

Tel: (852) 528-3251

Steps for Scholars/Students Sponsored by Central Government

1. Apply through one's university for a research visit overseas.

- through one's department chair
- processed by personnel department of the university
- approval by the university president in accordance with 3-5 year plan submitted by the university to the SEDC.

2. Take the English Proficiency Test (EPT), "the Chinese TOEFL".

3. University submits to SEDC about twice the number of proposals as their quota for sending scholars abroad for the year

4. Review procedure in SEDC

- panels of five experts in each field read and rank proposals
- SEDC makes final selections
- Criteria include: quality of proposal, China's need for the research, academic background of scholar, need to go abroad to accomplish the project, strength of overseas institution, English language level (EPT score).

5. Scholar may be assigned to half-year English language course in one of eight SEDC "going abroad training centers."

6. Scholars obtain IAP-66 forms from the American universities.

7. SEDC centers give passports (dark brown cover); also arrange exit permits and air tickets.

8. Obtain J-visa at U.S. consulate or embassy.

9. Attend two week orientation by SEDC on Chinese and U.S. issues in study overseas.

10. Depart for the U.S.

Steps for Scholars/Students Sponsored by Workunits

1. Exchange agreements are made between the Chinese university and a U.S. university or foundation. These include an arrangement for the Chinese side to send a certain number of scholars to the U.S. in specified fields for certain durations. Financial terms of who pays for what are included.

2. Selections of scholars are made according to the agreements. Often there is a bilateral decision process in which one side nominates and the other side accepts/rejects.

3. The Chinese university negotiates with the scholar a contract with terms such as duration overseas, what will be studied, who will pay for what, and the nature of support for dependents in China while the scholar is overseas. There is a general format for these contracts, but each university makes its own variations. (Sometimes scholars are expected to repay the university the cost of air tickets to the U.S. from the stipends they receive in the U.S.)

4. The Chinese university sends the SEDC notice of intent to send a scholar to the U.S. SEDC does not make an academic review. Dark brown covered passports are issued. This sometimes requires the scholar to travel to Beijing or another major city, and may include orientation sessions.

5. With Chinese passport and IAP-66 form in hand, the grantee applies for J visa at U.S. embassy or consulate.

6. Get exit permit from public security bureau.

7. Arrange tickets locally and depart for the U.S.

APPENDIX

G

INFORMATION ON MINIMUM REFERENCE BOOK SHELF

A Guide to Educational Advising and Student Services

within the

Advising, Teaching, and Specialized Programs

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

United States Information Agency

Division (E/AS)

Office of Academic Programs

December, 1988 edition

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IV. **International Student Exchange Program**

APPENDIX

H

LIST OF U.S. CONSULATES IN CHINA

U.S. Embassy and Consulates in China

U.S. Embassy
Address: Xiushui Bei Jie #3
Beijing, PRC
Telephone: 52-3831

U.S. Consulate General/Chengdu
Address: Jinjiang Hotel
180 Renmin Nan Lu
Chengdu, PRC
Telephone: 28-24481 ext. 130-141

U.S. Consulate General/Guangzhou (Canton)
Address: Dongfang Hotel
Lui Hua Road
Guangzhou, PRC
88-5000 ext. 1000

U.S. Consulate General/Shanghai
Address: 1469 Huaihai Zhong Lu
Shanghai, PRC
Telephone: 33-6880

U.S. Consulate General/Shenyang
Address: 40 Lane 4, Section 5
Sanjing Lu
Heping District
Shenyang, Liaoning PRC
Telephone: 29-000

APPENDIX

I

INFORMATION ON ADVANCE PAROLE FOR PRC NATIONALS

NAFSA
National Association for Foreign Student Affairs
1860 19th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009

Central Office 202/462-4811
Fax 202/667-3419
Telex 7401884-CIAOUC

PRESIDENT
Jean Delaney
University of Colorado-Boulder

PRESIDENT-ELECT
Martin Limbird
Ball State University

VICE PRESIDENT FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS
Dennis Peterson
Iowa State University

VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT FOR REGIONAL AFFAIRS
Denise A. Connerty
Butler University

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
John F. Reichard

Information on Advance Parole for PRC Nationals

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) can allow an alien to depart and re-enter the United States through the issuance of an "advance parole" or advance permission to re-enter the United States (form I-512). The I-512 is not an application to be filed with INS but, rather, a document issued from INS to the alien with his/her picture affixed thereto and with instructions to the port-of-entry officials to be followed in admitting the alien to the United States. The I-512 is issued valid for a specific duration and may not be extended by an alien outside of the United States. The alien normally requests advance parole from the INS district director who has jurisdiction over the alien's place of residence in the United States.

A request for advance parole normally consists of a letter from the alien specifying the reasons for departure, three identical passport-size photos, a copy of the I-94 card, and information needed for issuance of the I-512. The latter includes the alien's full name, date and city and country of birth, current U.S. address, INS "A file" number (if any), and dates of expected departure and return. In the case of PRC nationals, the letter should set forth the reason for the departure, such as a family emergency, international conference, or other need for travel. A copy of the conference invitation or schedule, or communication such as a telegram or cable stating the family emergency, should also be included with the letter. Photos and the information outlined above should also be submitted for each family member who will be traveling with the alien. Foreign student advisers should check with the local INS office regarding filing procedures and processing times as well as whether a personal appearance by the alien is required.

Upon receiving the I-512 from INS authorizing the advance parole request, the PRC national should review the document carefully to assure that it (1) covers a sufficient period of time to accommodate the contemplated travel, (2) allows for multiple entries if requested, (3) correctly states all biographical information, (4) includes a notation that the individual is to be permitted to re-enter in the same status he or she had upon depa··ture. In addition, the I-512 should have a notation that the PRC national will be re-admitted to the United

States under "the President's Executive Order 12711 of April 11, 1990." A visa is not required for re-entry.

Again, it is important that the individual re-enter the United States within the duration of the parole's validity. There is no provision for extension of the I-512's validity. Upon re-entry, the individual should receive an I-94 card with the prior status marked upon it (such as F-1, F-2, J-1, H-1, etc.). If the PRC national was not in a valid status prior to departure, then he/she will likely be given an I-94 indicating parole until January 1, 1994. However, the latter does not constitute an extension of the validity of the I-512. For additional travel outside of the United States a new request must be made to INS for another I-512 by submitting a letter, three pictures, and supporting information and documents (as outlined above).

Foreign student advisers may wish to review each advance parole request before submission, the I-512 before departure of the individual, and the entry documents upon re-entry in order to counsel the PRC national closely at each step. This is especially important in regard to the validity of the I-512 and the need for the PRC national to re-enter the United States before its expiration.

Written by Scott Cooper
GRAC/NAFSA
5/14/90